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I. INTRODUCTION
"We do not negotiate with terrorists"-the mantra has been repeated by
politicians and panelists, on the news and in cinema, to the point of
becoming a national axiom. I However, this mantra rarely holds up in
practice.2 Governments frequently engage in back channel discussion with
terrorist organizations, despite public assertions to the contrary. ' Such
discussions can provide pragmatic benefits, while allowing for a measured
escalation of force consistent with the broader Law of Armed Conflict. The
expanded use of negotiation and mediation has the potential to bridge the
capability gap between domestic counter-terror measures and military attacks
on foreign territory, better equipping the United States to address emerging
transnational threats. As the Global War on Terrorism4 enters its 13th year,
the United States has gained tremendous exposure to a wide variety of
violent non-state actors. While American military action has focused
primarily on the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and more recently the Islamic State,
these groups are representative of a broad new field of violent non-state
actors. Ranging from common street gangs to private armies, violent non-
state actors are able to exercise considerable lethal capacity without the
restraints associated with state-on-state conflict. Despite a reemergence of
'Peter R. Neumann, Negotiating with Terrorists, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62276/peter-r-neumann/negotiating-with-
terrorists.
2 John Arquilla, Getting to Yes with the Taliban, FOREIGN POLICY (May 20, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/20/getting to yes-with the-taliban.
3 See Neumann, supra note 1. Examples from recent history include British
negotiations with the Irish Republican Army, Spanish talks with the Basque Homeland
and Freedom separatist movement, and Israeli discussions with the Palestine Liberation
Organization; all within a close timeframe to serious terror attacks.
4 The War on Terrorism, BOUNDLESS, (July 21, 2015), http://www.boundiess.
com/political-science/foreign-policy/history-of-american-foreign-policy/the-war-on-
terrorism/.
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state-centric tensions as a source of national security concern, non-state
actors pose a persistent and imminent threat to global security.s
The international legal treatment of non-state actors has failed to keep
pace with the rapid evolution of such organizations.6 Before non-state actors
developed the capability to strike globally, acts of terrorism were
traditionally considered a matter of domestic criminal law.7 However, the
transnational nature of contemporary terrorist groups renders their
organizations resilient to domestic prosecution. The Law of Armed Conflict
does provide some provisions for the use of military force against non-state
actors, despite its primary focus on state centric conflict. 8 However,
prosecuting non-state organizations under its tenants has proven difficult.
Direct engagement may provide a more immediate and efficient means of
dismantling such organizations, as opposed to protracted litigation with
territorial governments or controversial kinetic strikes.
In order to understand how best to apply Alternative Dispute Resolution
techniques to violent non-state actors, we must understand how the unique
attributes of these two concepts interact with one another. First, this requires
an analysis of contemporary violent non-state actors. This analysis will
include their offensive and defensive capabilities, types of organizational
structures, and what drives their resilience to conventional military action.
Second, this piece will address how the Law of Armed Conflict treats such
organizations, why nations primarily use self-defense arguments to justify
actions against such groups, and the limited utility the law has for actually
combatting violent non-state actors. Finally, this article will address how
negotiation and mediation may be employed against violent non-state actors;
the former when such actors are identifiable in an area under relative control,
and the latter when such groups remain anonymous or inaccessible.
s Robert J. Bunker, Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors, 43 U.S. ARMY WAR
COLLEGE Q. PARAMETERS 57 (Winter 2013-14).
6 Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483, 491 (2012) (discussing the lack of
coherent standards for the use of extraterritorial self-defense against non-state actors
operating within a sovereign territory).
' Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism under the Jus ad
Bellum: A Normative Framework, 56 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 8 (2008).
8Id.
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II. DEFINING NON-STATE ACTORS
The emergence of non-state actors as powerful players in global
governance is not limited to those with violent intent or to the national
security realm. The term non-state actor may refer to any association without
nation-state status, which seeks to assert influence over international affairs.9
Examples include Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), industrial
organizations, and international environmental groups.'0 Non-state actors are
also a prevalent form of organization in both the scientific and sustainable
development community." The emergence of such groups has shifted power
from more traditional forms of government, which have struggled to adapt to
a more globalized society.12
The emergence and ability of non-state actors to impact security on a
global scale is a relatively new phenomenon." Where large-scale conflict
previously required the marshaling of national level resources, a number of
factors have altered this dynamic:
A number of developments explain the emergence of this new breed
of conflict. Technological developments have enabled non-state
actors to wield military capabilities that were previously unimagined.
The process of globalization, which allows more freedom in the
movement of people and goods, has also served to empower non-
state actors. Finally, the accelerated process of state creation over the
past century has created states that are too weak to prevent non-state
actors from using their territory as a base for launching hostilities
against other states.14
Ultimately, the increased prevalence of violent non-state actors can be
attributed to a decrease in the cost of organizing and waging conflict. As
violent non-state actors increase in number, they also increase in variety.
Some organizations pursue traditional criminal activity, albeit on a global
9 CRAIG CALHOUN, DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2002).
1o Joyeeta Gupta, Non-State Actors in International Governance and Law: a
Challenge or a Blessing, 11 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 497 (2005).
" Id
12 Id
13 Roy S. Sch6ndorf, Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal
Regime?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 10 (2004).
14 Id.
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scale, while others are driven by political and religious ideology. " An
accurate understanding of the nature and intent of any such organization is
critical to determining whether it can be effectively engaged by ADR
techniques.
A. Placing Non-state Actors on the Threat Spectrum
The term violent non-state actor can encompass a broad range of
organizations with varying abilities to undermine social order." They may be
motivated by religion, political ideology, legitimate opposition to an
oppressive regime, or merely profit." In order to better understand such
entities, it is helpful to focus on organizational structure rather than specific
goals. Ideologically opposed groups may adopt similar organizational
structure based on external factors such as member security, operating
environment, or simple efficiency.
Criminals Criminal-Soldiers
Limited Violence Capability High Violence Capability
Limited Corruption Capability High Corruption Capability
Parasitic with the State Successor to the State
PrivateArmies
(Landpower Mimicking)
Organized mafiasin
Gangs Crime Cartels Terrorists Sicarios Insurgents Warlords Uniform
18
Different classifications of violent non-state actors can be placed on a
threat-continuum, based on their capacity for violence and corruption." On
the low end of the spectrum are criminals; common street gangs and
" Neumann, supra note 1.
6 Bunker, supra note 5, at 58.
7 Id
18 Id
19 Id
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organized criminal enterprises, leading up to cartels. Terrorists, as a loosely
defined class, are placed before the violent non-state actors which organize
in a more military fashion. These criminal-soldiers include insurgents,
warlords, and uniformed private armies. The criminal classes, and to a lesser
extent terrorists, are considered parasitic to the state, while the criminal-
soldier classes openly challenge state authority.20
Certain organizations may transition between classifications based on
organizational success, or simultaneously exhibit the characteristics of
multiple classifications. The classic example would be a gang growing into a
criminal enterprise and finally a cartel. 2 ' Other organizations may divest
themselves into multiple criminal enterprises. For instance, members of the
Taliban, which may be considered insurgents or terrorists depending on the
specific actors or intended targets,22 finance their operations through narcotic
trafficking.23 Many of these transitions are both enabled by the factors
driving globalization, and a reaction to globalization's negative
consequences. 24
Controlling such groups has proven quite difficult. Along the criminal
spectrum, both a capacity for violence and capacity to corrupt increase
simultaneously. The warlord is thus better equipped both to combat and to
corrupt a local government than a gang would be. However, these variables
do not align on the corollary state-power spectrum.25
20 d
21 Id. at 59.
22 Michael Rubin, Yes the Taliban are Terrorists, COMMENTARY (Jan. 19, 2014),
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2014/01/19/yes-the-taliban-are-terrorists/.
23 Gretchen Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban, UNITED STATES INST. OF PEACE
(Aug. 2, 2009), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/taliban_opium_1.pdf.
24 Bunker, supra note 5, at 65.25Id. at 60.
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Police Military
Arrest Destroy/Kill
Criminal intelligence Military.intelligence
High Anti-Corruption LoiAnti-Corruptidon
Capability Capability
Low Antl-Violence High Anti-Violence
Capability Capability
Intro*State Focus Inter-Stae Focus
Gendarmerie
Investigative EOD .. Core Landpower Forces
Patrol BombSquad Military Special Airborne Ught Heavy
Community Une SWAT Police Forces Mountain Mechanized Mechanized
Municipal Municipal Municipal Federal :
Regional Regional
Federal
26
When a nation needs to exert legitimate force, its options range from
municipal law enforcement to heavy mechanized divisions. This spectrum
recognizes anti-violence capability, 27 which increases with the size,
equipment, and complexity of the organization. However, it does not include
anti-corruptive capacity, 28 which maximizes at the low end of the spectrum.
Generally, local police departments are best equipped to deal with corruption
due to investigative capacity and police power not present on the military
side of the spectrum. Civil liberty ramifications prevent the consolidation of
intra-state police power and inter-state war power into a single organization.
This disconnect complicates the ability of nations to confront transnational
criminal and terrorist organizations.
B. Organizational Operation: Personal and Digital Networks
Technology has fundamentally altered how non-state actors operate,
radically enhancing their abilities both to organize internally and promote
their message externally. The Internet provides a means by which such actors
may communicate transnationally and anonymously.2 9 Bypassing traditional
territorial boundaries allow such organizations to protect themselves from
prosecution in any single nation. Violent non-state entities may inspire the
26 Id
27The deterrence and suppression of hostile forces.
28e capacity for internal investigations and community policing.
29 See CONVERGENCE: ILLICIT NETWORKS AND NAT'L SECURITY IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION (Michael Miklaucic & Jaqueline Brewer eds., 2013) [hereinafter
CONVERGENCE].
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formation of affiliate organizations without an agent ever visiting the
affected country. 30 Ultimately, this allows for decentralized ideological
movements to coordinate their collective actions, and for more hierarchal
entities to disperse their command and control elements in a protective
manner.
For a nation-state centric international dispute resolution system, this
poses unique challenges." Most forms of international dispute resolution are
adapted to interact with hierarchical organizations, be they national
governments or multi-national business enterprises. 32 However,
contemporary violent non-state actors often associate based on ideological
grounds rather than strict objectives. As General McChrystal3 3 has observed,
"[1]ike their allies in al-Qaeda, this new Taliban is more network than army,
more a community of interest than a corporate structure." " While this
specific observation was based on his experience with al-Qaeda and the
Taliban in particular, the concept of non-state actors as a "community of
interest" may be applied to ideologically driven violent non-state actors
broadly.
While ideologically driven groups may prefer such decentralized
methods of leadership, this posture could also be driven by the pressure
exerted by counter-terror military operations. " More hierarchical
organizations, such as the Mexican drug cartels, have adopted similar
methods when threatened 6 "from competing actors and states, [and] they
tend to devolve into networks as a defensive response-when dominant in a
host environment more centralization becomes evident."3 7
Regardless of the degree of centralization employed, personal networks
are critical to the operation of violent non-state groups. Constantly under
threat from government action and rival groups, a high degree of trust is
required to sustain operations. Based on observations from Iraq:
30 See Thdr~se Postel, The Young and the Normless: Al-Qaeda's Ideological
Recruitment of Western Extremists, 12 CONNECTIONS: THE Q. J. 99, 117 (2013).
31 CONVERGENCE, supra note 29, at xviii.32 1d
33 General Stanley A. McChrystal retired from the U.S. Army in 2010 after
commanding the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and the Joint
Special Operations Command from 2003 to 2008.
3 Stanley A. McChrystal, It Takes a Network, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 21, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it takes-a-network.
3s Bunker, supra note 5.
36 d
37Id
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[I]t [has become] increasingly clear--often from intercepted
communications or the accounts of insurgents we had captured-that
our enemy was a constellation of fighters organized not by rank but
on the basis of relationships and acquaintances, reputation and fame.
Who became radicalized in the prisons of Egypt? Who trained
together in the pre-9/11 camps in Afghanistan? Who is married to
whose sister? Who is making a name for himself, and in doing so
burnishing the al-Qaeda brand?"
Understanding the extent of such personal relationships, and the degree of
centralized decision making, is critical to ultimately determining whether
dialogue with a non-state actor is possible.
C. Limits on the Application of Conventional Combat Power
The lessons of the past decade have been hard learned through the
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular. Despite objective combat
superiority, the U.S. has struggled to achieve articulable military victory in
these conflict zones.39 Two main factors drive this limitation: a disconnect
between military capability and mission, and a disconnect between military
capability and national policy.4"
At the outset of the War on Terror, the U.S. was poorly equipped for the
task at hand, both doctrinally and from an organizational perspective. Pre-
9/11 military force structure was largely unchanged since the Cold War. The
U.S. military was well prepared to face a technologically advanced peer-
military competitor. However, the limitations of vehicles and equipment
poorly suited to irregular warfare lead to a scramble to field adequate
replacements. 4 1 Doctrinally, the U.S. was equally unprepared to fight on
what would become known as the human terrain. 42 Just as U.S. equipment
38 McChrystal, supra note 34.
39 Id.
40 The U.S. entered the Global War on Terror with a force structure and equipment
philosophy left over from the Cold War. The focus on large scale force-on-force conflict
placed emphasis on heavily armored vehicles as opposed to the more maneuverable
assets required in Afghanistan. A focus on large, expensive systems put the U.S. at a
financial disadvantage in asymmetric conflict, short of total war.
41 Alex Rogers, The MRAP: Brilliant Buy, or Billions Wasted?, TIME (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://nation.time.com/2012/10/02/the-mrap-brilliant-buy-or-billions-wasted/.
42 The Human Terrain System, UNITED STATES ARMY (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/.
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was not optimized for counterterror operations, U.S. training did not
adequately prepare deploying troops to interact with the local population.
From a national policy perspective, there was a disconnect between what
policy leaders hoped to achieve through the application of military force, and
what such force could actually achieve.43 While the military has high anti-
violence capacity, it has low anti-corruption capacity.44 The military can
suppress violent action; it cannot address the root causes of violence, and
thus not pacify a region. Non-military engagement was a critical component
overlooked during early war planning. While conventional military force is
poorly suited to addressing the threat posed by violent non-state actors, the
law governing the use of such force is equally poor suited to the task.
Negotiation and mediation present opportunities to modify this posture in a
beneficial manner avoiding any potential challenge under the Law of Armed
Conflict.
III. TREATMENT OF VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS UNDER THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT
Following the bloodshed of the early 20th century, the Law of Armed
Conflict was adopted as a means to minimize unnecessary suffering in future
conflict. The treaties recognize rights in sovereign nations to include self-
defense and territorial integrity. While provisions address non-state actors
within the Law of Armed Conflict, such groups do not possess reciprocal
rights to nation states, especially to territorial integrity. When such groups
pose the risk of harm to nations, the traditional self-defense test is triggered.
However, the application of defensive force, balanced against territorial
integrity, requires special consideration.4 5
A. Background on the Law ofArmed Conflict
The emergence of loosely organized non-state actors has generated a
broad range of legal questions regarding the treatment of such militant
groups. The Law of Armed Conflict was drafted with state-on-state conflict
43 Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills, STRATEGIC LANDPOWER TASK
FORCE (May 2013), http://www.ausa.org/news/2013/Documents/Strategic%20
Landpower/o20White%2OPaper/2OMay%20201I3.pdf.
"Bunker, supra note 5.
45 Schmitt, supra note 7.
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in mind.4 6 Its tenets are geared toward identifying lawful combatants and
legally permissible tactics during wartime.4 7 By limiting operations to legally
acceptable bounds, the intent is to minimize unnecessary civilian casualties,
prevent atrocities, and better facilitate lasting peace after the cessation of
hostilities.4 8 The law is designed to influence pre- and post-war behavior, as
much as the behavior during combat.49
Past enforcement of the Law of Armed Conflict depended heavily on the
nation-state status of the belligerents."o Following World War II, the most
notorious trials were those prosecuting former Axis leaders for war crimes.5 '
Since that time, the UN has sought to delegitimize state on state conflict.5 2
Despite an overall reduction in such conflict," the law of war remains
focused on conventional conflicts, and is thus under equipped for addressing
belligerent non-state actors. 54 As more conflicts become asymmetric in
nature, even classifying them as "war" becomes difficult, however the
distinction remains critical:
These questions carry more than mere theoretical significance.
Determining whether a certain situation constitutes war - and if so,
whether it is war of the intra-state or inter-state variety - determines
in turn the legal regime that should apply to it. For example, in times
of peace states are not allowed to target individuals, and they are not
allowed to detain people indefinitely without first trying them in
court. During an inter-state armed conflict, however, a different legal
regime applies: The armed forces of the warring states may lawfully
target enemy combatants and military objectives, and battlefield
46 LTC Richard P. DiMeglio, et al., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK (MAJ
William J. Johnson & Maj Andrew D, Gillman eds., 2012).
47 Id. at 19. ("While there are numerous LOAC treaties in force today, most fall
within two broad categories, commonly referred to as the "Hague Law" or "Hague
Tradition" of regulating means and methods of warfare, and the "Geneva Law" or
"Geneva Tradition" of respecting and protecting victims of warfare.").
48Id at8.
49 Id at 9.
50 Id. at 19.
" Id at 16. (Post war tribunals in Nuremburg, Tokyo, and Manila represented
immense progress in post-conflict accountability over previous conflicts).52 Id at 17.
" Joshua S. Goldstein, World Peace Could Be Closer Than You Think, FOREIGN
POLICY (August 15, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think_
againwar.
54 Sch6ndorf, supra note 13.
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detainees may be held until the cessation of hostilities, so long as
they are accorded prisoner-of-war status."
The United States government has had internal disputes amongst its branches
pertaining to those same issues, particularly surrounding the Authorization
for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUMF). 56 The Bush
administration relied heavily on this statute for its counter-terror campaigns,
and was given broad discretion for military engagements in cases such as
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld." The Obama administration has continued to rely on
this statute for its wide spread drone strike campaign, which has been
considered permissible under the Laws of Armed Conflict."
In addition to these unique complexities, enforcing the Law of Armed
Conflict suffers from the same deficiencies as any adjudicative process. The
complexity, long trial periods, limited ranged of possible outcomes, and
entrenchment of adversarial relationships plague international courts as much
as domestic civil or criminal dockets. The introduction of non-state actors
adds further complexity, and some have argued that a new legal regime may
be necessary to address extra-state or non-state armed conflict." "Current
legal literature on the topic is limited by the assumption that the laws of war
apply only when the situation is governed by the Geneva Conventions." 60
However, that the Conventions "cover certain types of armed conflicts does
not preclude the possibility that there may be additional categories of armed
conflict that are not regulated by the Conventions."' New threats have
forced the world to rapidly generate new understandings of the traditional
LOAC. Large-scale transnational terrorism compelled the international
community to discover a normative architecture governing the legal basis for
counterterrorism that had been theretofore been rather obscure.6 2
5 5 Id. at 4-5.
s6 Khalil Dewan, Old Laws, New Enemy-The AUMF Debate and the Wat on on
Terrorism, HUFFINGTON POST (January 16, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/khalil-
dewan/old-laws-new-enemy-the-aul_b_9009690.html..
57See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
5 Michael Isikoff, Justice Department memo reveals legal case for drone strikes on
Americans, NBC NEWS (March 20, 2014), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/
news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-
strikes-on-americans?lite.
* Sch6ndorf, supra note 13.
6o Id. at 6.
61 Id.
62 Bunker, supra note 5.
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B. National Self-Defense under the Law ofArmed Conflict
Under the Law of Armed Conflict there are only two scenarios under
which a nation may legally use military force; when sanctioned by a United
Nations Security Council resolution consistent with Chapter VII of the UN
Charter,63 or in instances of self-defense as authorized by Article 51 . Of
these two methods, self-defense has become the preferred mechanism for
attacking hostile groups.65 While the Security Council has passed several
resolutions indicating transnational terrorism constitutes a threat to
international peace and security, 6 it has never expressly mandated the use of
force in response to terrorism." This decision could be a function of the
Council's general aversion to authorizing the use of force, or of the veto
power held by the Council's five permanent members.68
Self-defense is the preferred means of legitimizing the use of force under
LOAC, given its broader application and that the threatened nation is the sole
decision maker concerning the use of force. 6 9 "Article 51 makes no mention
of the nature of the entity that commits the offending armed attack,""o as is
the case with other UN provisions, implying a broader grant of discretion in
determinations of self-defense. Strikes against non-state actors presumptively
fall within this discretion, provided that they adhere to broader LOAC norms
63 U.N. Charter Chapt. VII.
I U.N. Charter Art. 51.
65 Bunker, supra note 5.6 See S.C. Res. 1438, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1438 (Oct. 14, 2002), S.C. Res. 1440, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1440 (Oct. 24, 2002), S.C. Res. 1450, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1450 (Dec. 13,
2002), S.C. Res. 1465, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1465 (Feb. 13, 2003), S.C. Res. 1516, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1516 (Nov. 20, 2003), S.C. Res. 1530, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1530 (Mar.11,
2004), S.C. Res. 1611, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1611 (July 7, 2005), S.C. Res. 1618, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1618 (Aug. 4,2005)
6' Bunker, supra note 5, at 58.
68 Voting System and Records, THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/voting.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). The United
States, Britain, France, China, and Russia have permanent seats on the Security Council,
affording them veto power over Council Resolutions. Id. This is frequently the case given
the countries' divergent national interests. Id.
69 Deeks, supra note 6, at 495.
70 Schmitt, supra note 7, at 11.
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on the use of force. The most prominent criteria are that any use of force be
necessary, proportionate, and immediate relative to the threat at hand."
Any attack not adhering to the principles of necessity, proportionality,
and immediacy would be unlawful under the Law of Armed Conflict.
Necessity requires:
[T]here to be no viable option other than force to deter or defeat an
armed attack. This is a critical criterion in the context of terrorism. If
law-enforcement measures (or other measures short of self defense)
will assuredly foil a terrorist attack on their own, forceful measures
in self-defense may not be taken. The issue is not whether law
enforcement officials are likely to bring the terrorists to justice, but
instead whether, with a reasonable degree of certainty, law
enforcement actions alone will protect the target(s) from terrorism.72
The broad scope of this standard serves to allocate the risk of a wrongful
attack on those threatening acts of terrorism, rather than the victim nations.
Based on this standard, there is no requirement that a nation engage in
negotiations with hostile groups; unless there is absolute certainty that such
negotiations would thwart an imminent attack.
However, the imminence criterion poses additional challenges. A
defining characteristic of terrorist attack is the absence of warning.73 Given
the absolute reliance on surprise, terrorists do not signal their intent to
adversaries by making war preparations during the escalatory phase of
conflict. This requires a different set of presumptions when planning to
engage violent non-state actors. Violent non-state actors are distinguishable
from states in their lack of socially beneficial purpose; whereas there is a
rebuttable presumption that states will act within the bounds of the law, there
is an irrefutable presumption that violent non-state actors will act outside it.74
An attack, then, should be considered imminent from any group the conduct
of which is their avowed purpose. The final criterion, proportionality, is
satisfied so long as the amount of force utilized does not cause excessive
civilian harm relative to the military objective at hand.
n' DiMeglio, supra note 46, at 37 (explaining that these factors derive from the 19th
century "Caroline Case"). See generally 30 BRIT. FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 193 (1843),
reprinted in R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89
(1938).
72Schmitt, supra note 7, at 15.
7 3 Id at 17.74 Id at 18
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C. Territorial Sovereignty and the "Unwilling or Unable" Test
Based on the above analysis, nations have seemingly broad discretion to
strike at their discretion, rendering moot the need for prior negotiations.
However, there are countervailing principles in international law beyond an
individual nation's right to self-defense.7 s Most prominent is the right of
sovereignty, which demands territorial integrity." As violent non-state actors
disperse their networks across multiple sovereign nations, it becomes
increasingly difficult to attack them with military strikes or to coordinate an
international law enforcement effort.
Many nations may be unwilling or unable to take actions against violent
non-state actors operating within their territory. In other words, "[i]t is easy
to envision that a neutral state either might ignore its duties or face
significant practical difficulties in blocking a committed belligerent from
using its neutral territory for various war related purposes." " Such
difficulties may include: a weak central government, a lack of military
resources, an ideological sympathy for the hostile group, or a fear of
retaliation from the group." Regardless of these deficiencies, the territorial
nation retains its right of sovereignty.
In order to attack groups so located, the threatened nation must argue
that the territorial nation is unable or unwilling to interdict hostile actors
within its borders. " "There is little question that the test exists as an
internationally-recognized norm governing the use of force; given how
regularly states and commentators evoke it."" However, the exact judicial
standards of this test remain unarticulated." The result is an inconsistent
application of military force, even under similar conditions. 82 This is
especially problematic when combating transnational terror organizations,
whose networks encompass multiple different countries. The "unwilling and
unable" test may be used to justify a strike on a country that could
conceivably take action, while terrorists in a genuinely incapable territory
may be ignored. Such asymmetries create significant international tension, as
" See generally Deeks, supra note 6.
76 Id
n Id. at 499.78 Id
7 Id
" Id at 503.
8 Id
82 Id
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do the agreements required to conduct such strikes, such as basing, supply,
and flyover rights for military aircraft.83 Ultimately, the constraints on the
threatened nation are strategic rather than legal; whether they wish to face
international controversy and complication rather than strictjudicial penalty.
IV. NEGOTIATION AS A TOOL AGAINST KNowN, GEOGRAPHICALLY
CONSTRICTED, AND INSURGENT NON-STATE ACTORS
That successful negotiations with violent non-state actors are possible is
not to suggest that they are always advisable. There a number of risks, both
from a security position and from a policy position, which would suggest that
such negotiations are ill advised. Such risks include the potential to
legitimize violence as a tool when bargaining, rewarding terror groups for
deviating from international norms, and undermining non-state actors
seeking change through nonviolent means. 84 However, among a set of much
worse alternatives, negotiating may be the best option available to combating
violent non-state actors:
Overall, the historical record suggests there is much to commend the
notion of negotiating with terrorists. Talks must be undertaken with
much care and caution, and war-war must continue while the parties
jaw-jaw. But the potential for finding the way to peace, even in the
most pernicious conflicts, is far too good to overlook.85
Even with negotiations ongoing, military considerations must remain at
the forefront of decision-making. Negotiations must be seen as a tactic
within the broader military strategy, rather than an independent or terminal
phenomenon. In other words, "[t]he key is to be able to discern the difference
between situations in which the terrorists are simply manipulating the
negotiation process to play for time or score propaganda points, and those in
which there is real hope for peaceful progress."" Unless commanders are
able to understand the role of negotiations in the context of the broader
military picture, they run the risk of those negotiations being used to their
disadvantage. However, in certain operational situations, negotiations may be
the most expeditious means available to dismantle a terrorist network. This is
8 Bunker, supra note 5.
* See generally Neumann, supra note 1.
8 Arquilla, supra note 2.
86 Id.
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especially true when individuals within the network are identifiable, are
operating within known or restricted geographical boundaries, and the
network itself is in a defensive or insurgent posture, as was the case during
the later stages of the Operation Iraqi Freedom.
A. The difficulty inherent in negotiating with non-state actors
In the Frequently Asked Questions section of their book, Fisher and Ury
directly address the concerns related to negotiating with terrorists. 8
However, to borrow from their own theoretical framework, they speak of
terrorists in terms of positional rather than interest based bargaining. The
presumption is that those who resort to terror are ordinary human beings,
who will revert to members of the general population once their short term
financial or political goal is achieved. Their language elicits the image of
financially motivated Hans Gruber in Die Hard rather than the ideological
extremists who populate today's battlefields. A more holistic understanding
of which groups may be engaged with, and how to engage those groups, is
essential to successfully negotiating with them. Each organization must be
treated as a unique entity, governed by its own laws and customs, which may
or may not be wholly rational. Treating such groups as generic parties to a
negotiation will only increase the likelihood such talks will fail.
1. Which groups can be negotiated with?
While the decentralized command structures preferred by violent non-
state actors may render them resistant to military strikes or criminal
prosecution, it can also render them vulnerable to certain negotiating
techniques. As previously discussed, many non-state actors may be
considered a community of interest, rather than a defined institution. Even
those groups with a more hierarchal structure may still have identifiable sub-
groups with divergent interests. Recognizing and engaging the differing
interests within transnational organizations may be the key to their undoing.
A primary feature of networks is that no single unit is likely to have
access or influence to all other units." This can be observed in militant
groups united against a common enemy. While their actions may appear
unified to the adversary, there may be limited coordination among the
subunits. Loyalty among groups or factions may extend only to the next
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closest affiliate, rather than the movement as a whole. Those groups with the
most limited loyalties should be identified and engaged with first, as they are
the ones most likely motivated by personal interest rather than ideological
goals.
Fisher an Ury discuss "separating the people from the problem" 9" as a
means to deconflict hostile negotiations. With violent non-state actors, this
may not always be possible. Some combatants may be so invested in the
cause that capitulation is unthinkable. The authors fail to adequately explore
the extent to which ideologically driven terrorism differs from interest driven
terrorism. Ideologically driven groups have taken a campaign based
approach to acts of terrorism, meaning any specific act may not have an
associated interest based objective. For such groups, the use of terrorist
tactics has become an institutional norm, rather than a tool of last resort. In
conventional military engagements, killing is considered a means to an end,
but for ideological terrorists it may be the end itself.
2. Which tactics to utilize?
The basic dichotomy of interest based and positional bargaining
advanced in Getting to Yes provides a starting point for addressing
negotiations with non-state actors, provided that modifications are made to
account for ideologically driven groups. It cannot be assumed that all groups
engaged in extra-state armed conflict would be motivated by what Western
strategists would consider rational goals.90 Even then, we must be prepared
for the instance that those rational goals are incompatible with our cultural
ideals or national security interests, and be prepared to offer alternatives.
For those groups motivated by simple monetary or territorial claims, a
distributive posture is to be expected. The question would be a simplistic
equation of if and how many of the aggressor's demands should be met in
exchange for which concessions. While this runs the obvious risk of
"rewarding bad behavior," it may be the only means to initiate subsequent
peace talks. The more complicated consideration becomes when ceding to
demands would further empower the violent groups. This is especially true
when the demands involve weapons or control of a territory. While weapons
may be a good barter chip for incentivizing a previously hostile group to turn
on a more dangerous enemy, those same weapons may be utilized in
9 FISHER, supra note 87, at 53.
* Neumann, supra note 1.
91 FISHER, supra note 87, at 77.
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unforeseen manners. 92 Likewise, while many groups are fighting for
territory, granting them a small amount may enable broader territorial
ambitions. Colombia faced this problem after granting the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels a territorial sanctuary, which was
used to stage broader attacks on the country.93
Interest based negotiations with violent non-state actors would prove
exponentially more difficult. Those groups utilizing violence to achieve their
ends may aspire to ends incompatible with modem society. This is especially
the case when ideological goals are sought. In such instances, there may be
no zone of agreement, and any creative solution may unduly empower the
aggressor group. When confronted by such groups, it may be the more
prudent tactic to determine which of its affiliates may be pacified through
distributive means before eliminating the remaining elements through
military action.
B. The Right Model: Sons of Iraq
By effectively identifying and engaging in dialogue with those violent
groups amenable to negotiations, positive security outcomes can be achieved.
A prime example can be drawn from the "Anbar Awakening" in 2004 Iraq.
Following the ouster of Sadam Hussein, the U.S. engaged in "de-
Ba'athization" - prohibiting members of the former Ba'ath party from
holding power in the new Iraqi government.94 The resulting power vacuum
caused the country to rapidly degenerate into sectarian violence. Sunni and
Shiite factions, both hostile to occupying coalition forces, regularly launched
acts of terror. At the height of the conflict, over 100 civilian casualties
occurred daily.9 5
With the situation becoming increasingly dire, the U.S. reached out to
Sunni tribesmen with a mutual interest in opposing Al-Qaeda. In exchange
' Sam Heller, Are CIA-Backed Syrian Rebels Really Fighting Pentagon-Backed
Syrian Rebels?, WAR ON THE ROCKS (March 28, 2016), http://warontherocks.com/2016
/03/are-cia-backed-syrian-rebels-really-fighting-pentagon-backed-syrian-rebels/.
9 Neumann, supra note 1.
9 Zachary Laub & Jonathan Masters, Everything You Need to Know About Al-
Qaeda in Iraq, DEFENSE ONE (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/01 /everything-you-need-to-know-about-al-
qaeda-iraq/76679/.
" Arquilla, supra note 2.
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for arms and training, the groups agreed to cease hostilities with coalition
forces and fight alongside them.96
More than 80,000 fighters shifted allegiance in this arrangement, tipping
the balance of power in coalition favor.97 The following six months saw a
90% reduction in violence.98
Coalition allied Sunni fighters would come to be known as the "Sons of
Iraq," and the alliance is considered one of the few breakthroughs of the Iraq
war. "[T]he original idea of bypassing terrorist leaders and reaching out
directly to those committing heinous acts was a real breakthrough, a model
of how to disrupt a network by aiming at the edges, rather than just trying to
rub out leaders."99
To be effectively implemented, negotiations required addressing anti-
coalition forces as a collection of different interests unified in opposition to
the U.S., rather than a categorical whole. From the combatant commander's
perspective, it may be difficult to identify which particular group one was
fighting at a given time. The real breakthrough came from increased
intelligence sharing and analysis.' 0 Through a better understanding of the
divergent interests among different violent non-state actors, effective
negotiations were made possible. Unfortunately, the current Iraqi
government failed to honor many of the agreements made after U.S.
withdrawal, erasing many of these gains.10 '
C. Counter Example: Al-Qaeda in Iraq
Violent non-state actors have also identified the benefits of specifically
targeting the individual elements of groups aligned against their interests. By
doing so, they can degrade coalitions organized against them, promoting the
environmental instability needed to flourish. Al-Qaeda in Iraq 10 2 proved
I Baghdad to Pay Sunni Groups, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com /news/middleeast/2008/10/200810151630737451 .html.
" Arquilla, supra note 2.
9 Id.
9 Id
10 McChrystal, supra note 34.
101 Arquilla, supra note 2.
102 A Sunni jihadist group, Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been operating in Iraq since before
the 2003 U.S. invasion. The group was formed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was
active in Afghanistan before fleeing to Iraq. While sharing the al-Qaeda name, the group
is sufficiently distinct from the Al-Qaeda commanded by Osama bin Laden,
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especially adept at this strategy, as demonstrated by their renewed aggression
in the region.
The notion of indirect action formed an important part of Al-Qaeda in
Iraq's strategy against the coalition. In essence, they attempted to create a
polycentric conflict in which individual factions could be isolated and
destroyed. 103 To isolate the United States, Al-Qaeda in Iraq directed a
significant portion of their attacks against coalition allies; hoping that these
allies would withdraw from the conflict. 1" Comparable attacks were
launched against infrastructure, Iraqi government personnel, and civilian aid
workers in an effort to deter collaboration.'o Finally, the Sunni Al-Qaeda in
Iraq deliberately stoked the ongoing Sunni-Shiite civil war, in an effort to
draw the U.S. military into this exhaustive conflict.'o
This strategy proved effective at creating backlash against the war, and
friction within coalition forces. Instead of expending their energy negotiating
with potential defectors among the insurgents, the coalition was forced to
negotiate amongst itself how best to sustain operations in the region.
V. THE USE OF MEDIATION TO ENGAGE UNKNOWN, GEOGRAPHICALLY
DISPERSED, AND OFFENSIVELY POSTURED NON-STATE ACTORS
The challenges and benefits of mediation generally parallel those of
negotiations when it comes to counter-terrorism; however, the dynamics of
mediated discussion lend themselves best to a differing set of operational
considerations. The ability to account for individual interests and mutually
beneficial conflict resolution noted in the negotiation section remain.
However, the presence of a mediator provides an additional, if not the only,
means of access to certain groups while enhancing the perceived legitimacy
of talks to the disputing parties. Despite these benefits, the risk of abuse
remains high, especially depending on the ideological persuasions or
strategic interests of the mediator. Undue deference to the cultural
expectations of terrorists runs the risk of legitimizing that culture on a wider
scale. Whereas negotiations are best leveraged against known non-state
demonstrating the non-hierarchal nature of such operations. See Laub & Masters, supra
note 94.
103 Id
'" M. J. Kirdar, Al Qaeda in Iraq, THE CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIEs 4
http://csis.org/files/publication/110614_KirdarAlQaedalraqWeb.pdf (last visited Nov.
16, 2015).
1os See Laub & Masters, supra note 94.
106 Id.
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actors operating defensively in restrained areas, mediation is strongest when
the targeted groups are anonymous, transnational, or decentralized entities.
Multilateral talks are a fixture of international diplomacy as it relates to
deescalating potential conflicts between nation states, and the parallels apply
to disputes with non-state actors.10 7
A. Bring Parties to the Table
Despite the risk of mediator bias, the use of a mediator may be the
critical first step to bringing non-state actors to the negotiating table.
Especially for those groups engaged in ongoing hostilities, there may be
significant apprehension to meeting with government authorities. Such
groups may only be willing to send agents on their behalf, or speak only
through third parties, if they can be found at all. For groups that have
decentralized and distributed membership transnationally as part of their
defensive posture, a third party mediator may be the only means of access.
This function may, in fact, flow naturally from the process of planning
military action against non-state actors. As previously mentioned, strikes
may only be launched on sovereign territory with consent, or when the
territorial government is unable or unwilling to eliminate threatening
groups. ' Additional consent from neighboring countries is required to
secure fly over rights for military aircraft or entry rights for other military
assets moving through sovereign territory. When combating regionally based
transnational terrorist groups, the surrounding governments could be called
upon to mediate disputes as an alternative to immediate military action.' 09
This extension of already required negotiations may be a preferable
alternative to the complexity and controversy surround kinetic military
action.
107 Schmitt, supra note 7.
10 Deeks, supra note 6.
11 The obvious example is the complex counter-terror relationship between the
United States and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda fighters routinely operate in the lawless border
region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, relying on the territorial integrity of Pakistan
to shield themselves from U.S. air strikes. Pakistan, for its part, has consented to strikes
in some instances and denied access in others. It is a critical, though somewhat unreliable
partner in ongoing peace talks, demonstrating both the opportunities and risks associated
with the use of local governments to facilitate discussion with regionally based
transitional terror groups.
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B. Facilitate ongoing discussion through hostilities
Ongoing hostilities during the discussions pose a significant threat of
derailing progress. This could include either the targeted killing of a high
level terrorist leader or the successful execution of a high-profile terrorist
attack, either of may induce the collapse of any progress made during
discussions. The selection of a mutually agreeable mediator may provide a
buffer against such obstacles. If both parties can establish that negotiations
will be held on a good faith basis, they may be more willing to participate.
However, that good faith basis must accept the reality of ongoing hostilities.
The use of a mediator with personal ties to an adversarial group may be the
only means of access, especially given such groups reliance on personal
relationships as a means of security during conflict.
To bolster the chances of reaching a mediated resolution, the mediator
could adopt a facilitative approach, setting the parameters for both the talks
and ongoing hostilities. Temporary rules of engagement for both sides could
reinforce the good faith basis for discussion. Such rules could include
restrictions on certain targets, or more ambitiously a temporary cease-fire.
The presence of a mediator could make such agreements more credible than
those arrived at through direct negotiation, which may be interpreted as the
pursuit of a temporary tactical advantage. In this capacity, the primary use of
the meditator should be to establish trust and stability otherwise lacking due
to the lack of transparency between the disputing parties.
C. Encourage disputing parties to adhere to terms of agreement
The final benefit from the use of a mediator is the additional layer of
insurance that the mediated agreement will be adhered to. The selection of a
mutually agreeable mediator, or even a mediator of necessity, demonstrates
that mediator has some ongoing access to the non-state actor in question.
Such persistent contact may be the only means of monitoring the actions of
the non-state group following the cessation of hostilities, or the groups'
individual members should it disband following discussion. In the case of
regional governments, their proximity to the non-state actors' prior territory
provides a degree of oversight not possible with simple negotiations. Such
governments may have their own national interests in keeping peace in the
region, providing additional reassurance against the reemergence of hostile
groups.
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VI. LIMITATIONS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF ARBITRATION
Unlike mediation, arbitration has little promise to achieve positive results
in counter-terror applications. The strengths of the process lie in its ability to
generate legally binding and enforceable outcomes. The enforceability of
these outcomes makes the process more appealing for disputing parties with
conflicting interests or mutual animosity. There is the belief that, should they
prevail, the decision will carry the weight of the law. To be effective then, an
arbitrator must have power over the disputing entities.
Unfortunately, the very nature of violent non-state actors indicates an
ability to act beyond the control of the law. Such groups tend to be criminal
by nature, whether they be in violation of domestic law or the law of armed
conflict. With the exception of those groups existing in state-sponsored
sanctuaries, they have demonstrated an ability to persist despite the efforts of
international law enforcement. This could be a function of the general
lawlessness of underdeveloped nations, as is the case with Somali pirates,1"o
or a function of the complexity of the organization, such as the Mexican drug
cartels."' Regardless of how they managed to evade law enforcement efforts,
an arbitrated agreement will likely have less deterrent effect on such groups
than conventional laws.
The worst consequence that violent non-state actors could be threatened
with for a violation of an arbitrated agreement would be a return to the status
quo. As is especially the case in the War on Terror, where hostile groups
have learned the extent to which we are willing to combat them. Most would
doubt that any violation of an agreement, short of a large scale attack on the
n0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WORLD FACT BOOK, (last visited Nov. 6, 2015)
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf so.pdf. (Somalia has lacked a stable, functioning
government for decades. Absent a centralized, stabilizing force, the country remains
contest by several warlords. Persistent poverty has caused many coastal villagers to turn
to piracy; capturing commercial cargo ships to be held for salvage or ransom.
Combatting piracy in this area is one of the largest ongoing international campaigns
targeting violent non-state actors.).
'" As Globalized Gangs Profit From New Regulations And Markets, Governments
Are Struggling To Keep Up, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/as-globalised-gangs-profit-from-new-regulations-and-
markets-governments-are-struggling-to-keep-up-2014-1. (Compared to other violent non-
state actors, transnational drug cartels are highly sophisticated. The revenue from their
operations rivals that of many Fortune 500 companies. Such organizations have been
known to hire business professionals, ex-special forces soldiers, and skilled engineers to
facilitate to production, protection, and illicit transportation of their product.).
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domestic United States, would elicit a military response beyond what they
currently endure. That embattled groups have not capitulated thus far
indicates that they do not find the status quo unmanageable.
While arbitrated agreements may have no deterrent effect on non-state
actors, those same groups may doubt such an agreement would deter their
enemies either. Returning to the relative power of the arbitrator, the arbitrator
would require combat power equal to or greater than either belligerent to
impose its judgment. When the combat power of one party radically exceeds
that of both the other party and the arbitrator, neither will expect the decision
to carry much weight. This dynamic is particularly pertinent to the United
States, which has the military capacity to strike globally nearly at will. In
essence, hostile groups would need to take the agreement in good faith,
rather than the belief any arbitrating power could prevent future hostilities.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite its frequent recitation, the mantra "We do not negotiation with
terrorists" does not hold up to scrutiny. It would be pragmatically unwise to
deprive ourselves of any tool in the fight against violent non-state actors,
even those which carry inherent risks in their use. National security
developments over the last decade demonstrate the need to expand, rather
than contract, the options available when confronting such groups.
Violent non-state actors represent the new normal in national security.
The factors driving their formation, including globalization, technology
proliferation, and response to law enforcement pressure, will persist for the
foreseeable future. So long as the Law of Armed Conflict remains focused on
controlling state-on-state violence, there will be disagreement concerning its
application to non-state actors. Such groups can be expected to exploit this
disagreement to their tactical advantage, using the law's protections as a
means to shield themselves from more powerful military adversaries.
For these reasons, any alternative means of engaging such groups should
be pursued, in order to expeditiously limit any harm they may cause. This
includes the use of negotiation when non-state actors are known and
geographically contained, and the use of mediation when they are
anonymous and dispersed. While these techniques carry inherent risks, the
risks associated with the failure to engage such groups are an order of
magnitude more severe in comparison.
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